In 2012, the beginning of a series of four official dialogues between the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian State was announced.[1] The objective: to bring to an end a part of the armed conflict which has ravaged this country for more than 50 years.
One of the issues discussed during the negotiations was that of guarantees of political participation. After five months of negotiation, in early November 2013 a preliminary agreement between both parties was reached, of which a key advance was that regarding guarantees for the direct political participation of social movements.[2] However, there was no mention whatsoever of how to guarantee the work of human rights defenders and organizations that do not aspire to run for election, but which, ultimately are those that lay the foundations of a different political option; not in the house of representatives, but in the streets, demanding the rights of the people; not in the town halls and regional administrations, but rather in rural areas advising leaders and communities on their rights to their land; not in the high courts, but representing the families of victims or supporting victims of sexual violence.
A high risk activity
Between 2009 and June 2013, 219 human rights defenders were murdered in Colombia.[3] Despite progress with regards to the regulatory framework and physical protection, each year the quantity of aggressions against this group continues to rise. In 2013, 366 human rights defenders in Colombia suffered some kind of aggression, of which 78 were murdered and 209 threatened; these figures are the highest level of aggressions in the last 10 years.[4] This continues to be the reality in 2014: the first trimester of this year saw a doubling of the number of aggressions against human rights defenders with respect to the same period last year, from 45 registered aggressions in 2013 to 96 in 2014.[5] These figures show that, despite the negotiations and the will to build peace, in Colombia the defence of human rights continues to be a high risk activity.
Many of the most threatened human rights defenders are beneficiaries of state protective measures. However, civil society organizations point out time after time that as long as these schemes are not accompanied by what they call “political” measures, the defence of human rights will continue to be a high risk activity in Colombia.[6]
Stigmatization
The “We Are Defenders” programme, which registers aggressions against human rights defenders, pointed out that during 2013, those months seeing the highest amount of harassments coincided with periods of social mobilization.[7] Last year in Colombia there were protests by diverse sectors of society on 148 days of the year, and in more than 50% of the country[8]; various organizations accompanied by PBI were present during these mobilizations and have denounced multiple and severe human rights violations committed by state actors, including baseless detentions and prosecutions, sexual assault, assault with firearms and blades, theft and damage to the property of small-scale farmers (campesino).[9] One of the most emblematic cases was that of the campesino protests of Catatumbo, during which defamations by high level representatives of the state, such as the Minister of Defence, defamed numerous leaders such as César Jerez and Eladio Morales of the Peasant Farmers’ Association of the Cimitarra River Valley (ACVC) saying that the protests were infiltrated by the guerrilla and that the leaders had links with the FARC.[10]
Many human rights defenders believe that baseless accusations and stigmatization by the government and other state entities have negative effects on public opinion and increase the risk of those targeted by such defamations, and consider public recognition from the President and high level government representatives to be the first necessary step toward the adoption of political protection measures.[11]
National human rights organizations believe that the National Guarantees for the Defence of Human Rights process has contributed to increasing the visibility and legitimacy of the work of human rights defenders. However, the reality is very different at the regional level; Colombian human rights networks regard agreements at the national level as meaningless if they fail to lead to concrete action that obliges regional authorities to implement the agreements.[12] Hence, human rights defenders highlight the importance of respecting those directives prohibiting specious accusations and stipulate that as long as measures are not taken against civil servants who fail to respect these directives, the incentives to do so will be negligible.[13]
Wire tapping
At the beginning of this year, the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective went, with the authorization of the government, to meet with the peace negotiators in Havana in order to present their proposals regarding transitional justice. Some days later, this confidential visit and some of the issues discussed were published by the think tank Colombia First, an organization founded by the ex-President Uribe.[14]
At the beginning of February 2014, the existence in Colombia of an illegal intelligence centre was uncovered. This centre had been tapping the communications of, amongst many others, the negotiating teams in Havana, human rights organizations, politicians and journalists.[15] This new scandal saw a return to national front pages of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) phone tapping scandal and the government’s failure to fulfil pledges such as the destruction of records that the now decommissioned DAS illegally acquired.[16]
Impunity
The Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission (CIJP) accompanies several Afro-mestizo communities in the Curvaradó y Jiguamiandó river basins. CIJP provides legal consultation and representation in cases against various business owners accused of the forced displacement of these communities in the late 90s. In August 2013, several business owners implicated in this case were found guilty and, according to the CIJP, a few days later neo-paramilitaries threatened that if any business owner were to be imprisoned or obliged to leave the area, they would assassinate members of CIJP and of the communities. This triggered a wave of threats and assaults against members of CIJP, which lead to the temporary withdrawal of the team stationed in the river basin.[17]
A constant worry amongst human rights defenders is the lack of progress in investigations into aggressions committed against them. According to the We Are Defenders programme, of the 219 murders of human rights defenders between 2009 and June 2013, 95% are still in impunity.[18] Furthermore, investigations into threats against human rights defenders have not produced any results at all; that is to say, impunity is 100%.[19] Such a high rate of impunity acts as a catalyst for new violations, given that the lack of sanctions communicates the message that it is possible to break the law without consequences.[20]
Specious prosecutions
In stark contrast to this lack of progress, human rights defenders point out that judicial bodies do often take action many human rights defenders, targeting them with charges of “rebellion” with weak,and in “many cases non-existent”, pretext.[21]
In this context, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders has recommended that States assure that “human rights defenders are able to carry out their work within a favourable legal, institutional, and administrative framework. In this sense, they must abstain from the criminalization of the peaceful and legitimate activity of human rights defenders, abolish all the administrative and legislative regulations that restrict the rights of defenders, and ensure that internal legislation respects basic legal principals and international norms regarding human rights”.[22]
Responsible Parties
According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “violence and social control by post demobilization armed groups and criminal organizations continues to affect every aspect of the human rights of the population and those of human rights defenders in particular.”[23] Likewise, the Information System on Assaults Against Human Rights Defenders (SIADDHH), points out that in 2013 neo-paramilitary groups were responsible for at least 50% of all aggressions committed against human rights defenders.[24]
A key political protection measure demanded by the social movement is precisely the dismantling of these neo-paramilitary groups. However, the State refuses to recognize their significance as an armed actor, defining them rather as Criminal Gangs (BACRIM) whose interests are limited to drug trafficking. International organizations have called attention to the similarities between these groups and the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia: their victims and methods are the same, they exert social control, they commit massacres of civilians and targeted killings of civil society leaders, they maintain a high level of organization and hierarchy, and they have a presence throughout much of the country.[25]
Other demands
Other types of political protection measures include, for example, the proposals for integral and collective reparations for peoples and communities who have been victims of the conflict; the compliance with orders included in the decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding the reparation of damages to some communities; or the adoption of recommendations from the United Nations and other international mechanisms such as the Inter-American Human Rights Court and Commission.
In November 2013, in the context of the National Guarantees Process, Colombian civil society platforms presented a proposal for a “National Guarantees Plan for the Defence of Human Rights in Colombia”. In this document the organizations made various demands such as: progress in the investigations against civil servants linked to human rights violations; public recognition of the democratic legitimacy of all civil society organizations; the purging of those state institutions linked to human rights violations; and responding to the stigmatization carried out by the armed forces.[26]
In a peaceful and democratic state, with assurances forthe free practice of the defence of human rights, it is fundamental that the guarantees necessary for democracy are not simply promises on paper, but rather are reflecting in a firm and constant commitment from the state. Today there are concrete proposals that could constitute a first step in one day bringing an end to impunity and paramilitarism in Colombia.
Just a few years ago, to consider a negotiated end to Colombia’s armed conflict was nothing more than a distant dream, yet today this has become a goal that everyday appears more and more attainable. In Colombia however, there doesn’t just exist an armed conflict but a social and economic one: large landowners continue to forcibly displace entire populations, women are still used as weapons of war, and above all, a group of women and men are, every day, risking their lives for one motive only: the defence of the most fundamental rights.
[1] Reuters: Cronología-Procesos de paz en Colombia, 28 of August 2012
[2] La silla vacía: El Acuerdo de participación política: lo acordado, lo aplazado y lo ganado, 6 of November 2013
[3] El Colombiano: En 2013 asesinaron en Colombia a 78 defensores de derechos humanos, según ONG, 23 of February 2014
[4] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe Siaddhh 2013: D de defensa, 21 of February 2014
[5] Programa Somos Defensores: Agresiones contra defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos en Colombia, enero-marzo 2014, 11 of April 2014
[6] PBI Colombia: La falta de medidas políticas de protección y el sueño de su existencia, 22 of July 2011
[7] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe Siaddhh 2013: D de defensa, 21 of February 2014
[8] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe Siaddhh 2013: D de defensa, 21 of February 2014
[9] Misión de verificación de derechos humanos: Segundo informe de la misión de verificación de derechos humanos en los departamentos de Cundinamarca y Boyacá, 28 – 31 of August 2013, 19 September de 2013.
[10] Semana: Las Farc y el vocero de la protesta en Catatumbo, 4 of July 2013; RCN: Gobierno revela pruebas que vinculan a líderes campesinos del Catatumbo con las Farc, 6 of July 2013; El País: César Jerez: ¿Un líder campesino del Catatumbo o un profesional de las Farc?, 10 of July 2013.
[11] Plataformas Colombianas de Derechos Humanos: Plan Nacional de Garantías para la defensa de los derechos humanos en Colombia, November 2013
[12] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe especial “Protección al Tablero”, February 2014
[13] PBI Colombia: La falta de medidas políticas de protección y el sueño de su existencia, 22 of July 2011
[14] Semana: Colectivo de Abogados: documento es “apócrifo”, 8 of November 2013
[15] Ccajar: ¿Alguien espió a los negociadores de La Habana?, 3 of February de 2014.
[16] El Tiempo: Chuzadas la historia sin fin, 5 of February 2014
[17] Cijp: Frustrado atentado a defensor de dh, 5 of August 2013
[18] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe especial “Protección al Tablero”, February 2014
[19] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe Siaddhh 2013: D de defensa, 21 of February 2014
[20] Plataformas Colombianas de Derechos Humanos: Plan Nacional de Garantías para la defensa de los derechos humanos en Colombia, November 2013
[21] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe especial “Protección al Tablero”, February 2014
[22] Consejo de derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas: Informe de la Relatora Especial sobre la situación de los defensores de los derechos humanos, Margaret Sekaggya, 23 of December 2013
[23] Oacnudh: Informe Anual de la Alta Comisionada de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, 24 of January 2014
[24] Programa Somos Defensores: Informe Siaddhh 2013: D de defensa, 21 of February 2014
[25] Plataformas Colombianas de Derechos Humanos: Plan Nacional de Garantías para la defensa de los derechos humanos en Colombia, November 2013
[26] Plataformas Colombianas de Derechos Humanos: Plan Nacional de Garantías para la defensa de los derechos humanos en Colombia, November 2013